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BOOK REVIEWS
Tm GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW, The Law Makers. By James Villard
Hurst. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1950. Pages xiii, 502.

$5.50.
It is impossible for me to give an intelligible short account of Professor Hurst's book because it does not fit into any of the familiar categories
of books about the law. It is easy to express a high opinion of the author's
scholarship, originality, industry and easy style of writing. Everyone who
has done any serious reading or thinking about jurisprudence is familiar
with the confusion caused by the many meanings of the word "law". From
the title of Mr. Hurst's book one might expect something like Judge Cardozo's "Growth of the Law," or perhaps something like Professor Gray's
"Nature and Sources of the Law," but there is no resemblance. Professor
Hurst is talking, as his sub-title suggests, about the principal American
institutions which have "made" the law and have themselves in turn been
"nade" by the law, or at least have been shaped by the law. Everyone
would expect to find the legislature and the court among such a list of institutions, some would expect to find also the executive department of government and the constitution makers, but few would expect to find the bar
treated, and with convincing aptness, as a maker of law.
Professor Hurst, who teaches at the University of Wisconsin Law
School, is an obvious disciple of the Pound school of sociological jurisprudence, a natural if not inevitable result of being one of 1)ean Pound's
students. The treatment of law as an adjustment of conflicting interests
and "as mediator in the general interest" is in the Pound tradition, but Professor Hurst's book differs from l)ean Pound's writings as a Brandeis brief
differs from a Holmes opinion. I am sure that Professor Hurst is quite at
home in a philosophical library but he has left the shelter of the library
to dig among the prosaic records of American institutions in action. His
digging seems as objective as that of an archeologist. As a result, we see
that our legal institutional selves are not nearly as pretty as we thought. The
reason, as Professor Hurst's investigation clearly shows, is that we have been
too absorbed in law as an adjustment of conflicting private interests to be
much concerned with law as mediator in the general interest. For example,
Mr. Hurst contrasts the legislative inventiveness of the bar in the interests
of private clients with the small contribution in the public interest in the
matter of legislative drafting.
Professor Hurst does not pretend to have exhausted his field of study
but only to have made a beginning. Doubtless one of the greatest results of
his book will be that it shows bright young lawyers that they can justify
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their professional lives by making and publishing community studies of law
in action. The studies in Florida badly needed are, among many others,
the use of the master in chancery as a substitute for the judge, the manner
of handling divorce cases, the governor's manner of handling the constitutional duty "to see that the laws are enforced," the effect of race in
criminal trials as to verdict and sentence, and the extent to which juries
ignore the law of contributory negligence and substitute comparative negligence. Heretofore, the main source of material for writers in law school
periodicals has been the opinions of appellate courts. This is the obvious
corollary of the case book method of teaching. The appellate opinion is a
valid and important, but by no means exclusive, object of legal study.
Professor Hurst shows us new areas of valid legal study so underworked
that laborers in it are assured of a socially fruitful reward. If some leave
the overworked field of rehashing appellate opinion so much the better.
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M'lExIco: THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND BREAD. By Frank Tannenbaum.
New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1950. Pp. xiv, 293, xi. $3.50.
Three years ago Mexico's newly elected president, Miguel Aleman,
declared that Mexico's long Revolution was over and that his country now
had a job of modernization to do. This book is a significant attempt to
evaluate the gains and analyze the results of that long, painful struggle out
of which modern Mexico has been born. Few men are better qualified to
make such a study than Frank Tannenbaum who has won for himself a
hemispheric reputation by his stimulating lectures and seminars at Columbia
University and whose knowledge of Mexico grows out of three decades of
familiarity with that country.
This is a book about Mexico. It began, however, as a study of the issues

at stake between Mexico and the United States since 1910. The author
quickly realized that the matters at stake could not be understood without
a careful study of the "Mexican complex of economic and social tensions
that gave the diplomatic dispute its peculiar flavor and significance." Understanding between the two nations became possible only when the United
States recognized that the basic premises upon which each nation based
its arguments were different and finally conceded to Mexico that same right
to determine its own policies for its own people that the American people
have always cherished for themselves. Before that
The American argument persisted in restating the traditional
position of the rights of foreigners contractually acquired under
previous law. The Mexicans denied the very basis of the contract,

